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THE STRENGTH OF THE VEBLENIAN CRITIqUE OF 
NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS
Svetoslav Semov
I. Introduction
 More than one hundred years ago, Thorstein Veblen wrote a powerful 
critique of neoclassical economics that castigated the discipline for turning the 
individual into a “lightning calculator of pleasures and pains, who oscillates like 
a homogeneous globule”, or equivalently, for the individual’s static maximization 
of utility based on exogenous preferences. His critique is relevant even today, 
since there are economists who still continue to criticize the assumptions of homo 
economicus and exogenous preferences, and insist on introducing more realism 
to economic theory (Tsakalotos 2005, 894). Furthermore, recent developments 
in game theory and experimental economics, which stand at the cutting-edge of 
economics today, are far more accommodating to the ideas of institutions that were 
central to Veblen’s theory than neoclassical economics (Hodgson 2007, 328).
 The goal of this paper is to examine the strengths of the Veblenian 
critique of neoclassical economics. In particular, it investigates whether or not 
Veblen’s rejection of the axiomatic approaches to economics is merely an attack on 
neoclassical economics which fails to provide an alternative positive theory (Hunt 
2002, 343). Starting with their conception of the individual, going through their 
theoretical frameworks, and ending with an investigation of how they approach 
a concrete issue, this paper offers a comparative exposition of the Veblenian and 
neoclassical approaches to economic theory.
 Seven sections follow. The first describes the notion of the individual 
in orthodox and heterodox economics. The second focuses on the different 
methodologies of these two strains of economics as developed out of their 
conceptualization of the individual. The third section presents the mainstream 
theory of consumption. The theory of Thorstein Veblen is used as a representative 
of heterodox economics and, consequently, the fourth section describes Veblen’s 
theory of conspicuous consumption. The fifth outlines a specific case – credit card 
debt – to which the two theories of consumption are applied. The sixth provides 
an accommodating picture of Veblenian thinking in the face of mainstream 
economics. The last section assesses the ideas presented and offers a conclusion. 
II. Origins of the concept of the individual in economics 
 A theory is defined by the way in which it conceptualizes the individual 
(Davis 2003, 16). Orthodox economics places a greater emphasis on the individual 
and conceptualizes it as a relatively autonomous and atomistic being. In contrast, 
heterodox economics  regards the individual as a being embedded in social and 
economic relationships. 
 The orthodox notion of the individual originates with John Locke and 
his idea that there must always be something about the individual that remains 
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unchanged (Davis, 24). The individual’s consciousness is disengaged from the 
world. There is a dualistic separation of the individual from the world. However, 
this presents the dilemma of how the inner subjective worlds of individuals link 
with the outer objective world. In The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith (Davis, 
24) only superficially resolved the dilemma by using the concept of unintended 
consequences and the idea that the market worked as if governed by an invisible 
hand. Yet Smith did not explain the precise mechanisms with which human 
psychology produced its effects on the market.  
 At the end of the nineteenth century a new strategy for linking Locke’s 
two worlds emerged – the theory of choice used by the early neoclassicals (Davis, 
25). They understood individual human behavior specifically as choice behavior. 
In contrast to Smith’s metaphorical treatment of how subjective interest is at work 
in the market, neoclassicals explained how subjective interest became material. 
That was achieved, for example, by using the concept of marginal utility to derive 
an individual’s demand for goods. 
 Contemporary mainstream economics took the neoclassical approach a 
step further towards the total elimination of subjectivity. Locke’s dilemma was 
resolved not by making a better connection between subjective and objective but 
by totally dispensing with the former. Consequently, all psychological content of 
the concept of the individual was emptied out (Davis, 26). His preferences came 
to be taken as given, rendering their character irrelevant to the analysis of rational 
choice. 
 The heterodox version of the individual originates in the thinking of mid-
nineteenth century authors such as Karl Marx and Emile Durkheim. Marx’s view 
of the individual is rooted in the theory of historical materialism (Davis, 109). 
There are two main components to this theory. The first is that the character of a 
society’s production and associated economic relations explain how its political 
and cultural relationships develop. The second is that all societies possess two 
main classes: one which supports the other through its work, and a second to 
direct the labor of the first. There is not much space for an important role of the 
individual. The individual is seen as a bearer of class identity and, consequently, 
not an independent agent. To put it differently, Marx is seen as the principle source 
of a tradition of economic thinking that treats the individual as being determined 
by social relationships. 
 The work of Durkheim further continues this tradition (Davis, 110). He 
criticizes neoclassical economics for its individualist orientation and contends that 
human nature is shaped by society. Society is an independent entity and needs to 
be examined on its own. Furthermore, the group thinks and acts quite differently 
from the individuals comprising it. As a result, if economic analysis falls on the 
individual it may fail to explain what takes place at the level of the group. 
 The framework for thinking about the individual established by Marx 
and Durkheim is used to various degrees in heterodox economics ever since. 
Original institutional economics, Marxism, Post-Keynesian, New Institutional and 
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Austrian economics provide a descriptively richer, contextually subjective, and 
fuller illustration of the individual than the concept of rational and economic man 
found in orthodox economics (Wrenn 2006, 489). Through discussions of mental 
models, structure, and agency, they are able to address the actual range of human 
behavior and reach beyond simple utility maximizing motivations. This does not 
suggest that these diverse groups of thought share a common method, but, rather, 
that, they possess common theoretical ground with respect to the conceptualization 
of the individual. A major common thread is the interdependence of agent and 
structure - in other words, interactive agency, where the individuals are affected 
by each other and by the institutional setting (Wrenn, 489). Clearly, this has its 
roots in the Marx-Durkheim framework of thought. 
III. Methodology
 Using this rather simplistic dichotomy between orthodox and heterodox 
economics, Thorstein Veblen’s work could be easily classified as heterodox. 
Veblen proposed that economics should be reconstructed as a “post-Darwinian” 
science. Basing his arguments  on the core ideas of Darwinism, Veblen insisted 
on developing causal explanations, where a cause is understood as necessarily 
involving transfers of matter or energy (Hodgson 2003, 86). Divine, spiritual or 
uncaused causes are ruled out. When Veblen’s understanding of Darwinism - in 
terms of a commitment to a detailed and sequential causal analysis – is transferred 
to the realm of economics, it meant that human intentionality and values also have 
to be explained.     
 The central tenets of orthodox economics are in stark contrast to those of 
heterodox economics. The ongoing debate between the two is multi-layered.  One 
of the dimensions of that debate positions the “positive” realm of facts and theory 
against the “normative” realm of values. In heterodox economics, as observed in 
Veblen’s understanding of Darwinism, the entanglement of values and economic 
theory is essential, for economics is concerned with reality and values are an 
integral part of it (Tsakalatos, 894). In contrast, orthodox economics bases its 
assumptions on homo Economicus and exogenous preferences (Tsakalotos 2005, 
894). Its proponents claim that it should be devoid of values and based solely on 
facts. They refuse to consider values as open to rational scrutiny. In other words, 
they do not require inquiry into their genesis but understand them as “revealed 
preferences” in the market with a price tag attached to them (Tilman 2006, 103). 
Furthermore, if their origin is at issue at all, it is for philosophers, sociologists and 
cultural anthropologists to further inquire.
 As already suggested in the preceding section, an important dimension 
of the debate between orthodox and heterodox economics is based on their 
conceptualization of the individual. In orthodox economics, the individual and 
his rationality are viewed as separate or isolated from the rest of society and 
social relations. This is the so–called “undersocialized conception of human 
action” (Yilmaz 2007, 842). The individual is seen as having an internalist view 
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of rationality – he is formed from the inside out (Wunder 2007, 833). Tastes, 
preferences, and beliefs also come from inside the person and are thus exogenous. 
The claim here is analogous to the case of values – the field of economics is 
restricted to internalist rational action, whereas the study of irrational action is 
relegated to sociology. 
 In contrast, heterodox economics, as suggested by Veblen’s insistence on a 
full explanation of human intentionality, employs an externalist view of rationality 
– tastes preferences and beliefs are socially constructed. Veblen’s concept of the 
individual is one in which the primary aspects of its beliefs are the result of the 
groups to which the individual belongs and the social norms and institutions to 
which the individual adheres (Wunder, 833). As explained later, Veblen’s depiction 
of “invidious distinction” and “emulation” as powerful forces, illustrates the case of 
the individual following the group. To put it differently, economic analysis, because 
of its ability to impact the institutional framework, should be more sensitive to the 
endogeneity of preferences and values (Tsakalotos, 899).
 Another facet of the debate between orthodox and heterodox economics 
is the clash between the realism and the predictive capacity of economic theories. 
In “The Methodology of Positive Economics,” Milton Friedman argues that the 
ultimate goal of positive economics is the development of a theory or hypothesis 
that yields valid and meaningful predictions about phenomena not yet observed 
(Friedman 1966, 7). Such a theory should be a complex mixture of two elements 
– it should construct a “language” designed to promote systematic methods of 
reasoning and it should contain substantive hypotheses that abstract essential 
features of the complex reality. 
 He goes on to contend that truly important and significant hypotheses are 
found to have assumptions that are wildly inaccurate descriptive representations 
of reality - the more significant the theory, the more unrealistic the assumptions 
(Friedman, 14). The reason is that a theory cannot possibly be thoroughly realistic 
in the immediate descriptive sense so often assigned. Any attempt to achieve this 
kind of realism renders a theory useless. To put it differently, according to Milton 
Friedman, any criticism of the axiomatic approaches of orthodox economics is 
largely beside the point unless supplemented by evidence that a hypothesis differing 
in its assumptions from the theory being criticized yields better predictions for a 
wide range of phenomena. The ultimate test of the assumptions of a theory is the 
validity of its predictions. 
 Consistent with Milton Friedman’s critique of unorthodox approaches 
as presenting merely criticism without yielding better predictions than the 
theory being criticized, Peukert argues that what Veblen offers instead of Homo 
economicus is Homo absurdus (2001, 544). Veblen’s intention was not to advance 
a theory in any positive sense. According to Peukert,
He [Veblen] had only one scientific aim, which he pursued by three 
different means. This aim was a radical and deconstructive critique of 
what he called prevailing habits of thought. He did not, and did not 
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want to, unfold a positive, new, and evolutionary approach which could 
practically be applied to the analysis of economic processes. He did 
not pretend to uncover any developmental logic of economic history or 
institutions. Instead, his destruction of deterministic theories and implicit 
teleological tendencies should be interpreted as his attempts to uncover 
the implications of the basic freedom of human choice and valuation. 
(2001, 544)
As already suggested, the heterodox approach to economic theory, as represented 
by the work of Thorstein Veblen, differs radically from the orthodoxy.  Veblen’s 
insistence on causal analysis emphasizes an inquiry into the genesis of values 
and rationality in a push toward more realism, whereas orthodox economics 
adheres to the importance of the predictive capacity and facts, associated with 
a theory. Undoubtedly, one of the most powerful attacks on Veblen is Peukert’s 
assertion that the former is merely constructing homo absurdus. The comparison 
between Veblen’s theory of conspicuous consumption and the mainstream theory 
of consumption that follows, suggests that this might not be the case. 
IV. The mainstream theory of consumption
 A huge break in orthodox economics that had implications for consumption 
theory is to be found in Irving Fisher’s work on interest (1930). Fisher objected to 
the classification of incomes as wages, rent, profits and interest in classical theory 
(Landreth, 267). He saw interest not as a share of income received by capital but 
as a manner of examining income flows of every kind. Fisher used the concept of 
intertemporal choices that he traced back to John Rae and Eugene Böhm-Bawerk 
(Chao 2007, 231). He argued that people prefer present over future consumption. 
This “human impatience” in its marginal form determines the rate of interest as 
the premium between the exchange of present and future goods (Chao, 231). 
Moreover, individuals can alter their income flows, and accordingly, consumption, 
by saving or borrowing (Landreth, 269). Consequently, the consumption level is a 
function of interest rates: at higher levels of interest, the quantity of consumption 
will decrease. 
 The starting point of the modern macroeconomic theory of consumer 
behavior are two theories developed in the 1950s by Milton Friedman and 
Franco Modigliani – the permanent-income hypothesis and the life-cycle 
model of consumption respectively (Jones 2008, 250). They were based on 
Fisher’s intertemporal choice model. Both of them stem from the observation 
that people prefer to smooth their consumption over time. This is nothing more 
than an application of the standard theory of diminishing marginal utility. The 
permanent-income hypothesis then says that people will base their consumption 
on the constant income stream that has the same present discounted value as the 
actual income stream rather than on their current income. The life-cycle model of 
consumption applies the same reasoning to a person’s lifetime. Consumption is 
based on “average” lifetime income rather than on income at any given age.
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 One crucial element of the framework of intertemporal choices is the 
expectations of future income when consumers face uncertainty. Friedman adopts 
the framework of adaptive expectations in forming expected income as a proxy 
for permanent income. However, this was challenged by Robert Hall’s rational 
expectations revolution in the 1960s as the latter was seen as a more realistic 
account of how consumers form their expectations (Chao, 232). Hall’s theory 
suggests that the consumer uses today’s consumption as the best predictor of 
future consumption because any available information was included in today’s 
consumption. In other words, Hall proved that consumption is a “random walk” 
– its future value is only a function of its present value. Hence, other variables, 
particularly, current and past incomes, can be excluded from the consumption 
function. 
 Although this is in clear contradiction with the conclusions of the 
theories of Friedman and Modigliani, economists usually see Hall’s theory as 
a continuation of the life-cycle-permanent income hypothesis. The reason is 
that Hall’s consumption theory contains a Fisherian framework in which the 
representative consumer intertemporally allocates his/her wealth on consumption 
(Chao, 232). 
 Chao argues that even if a model is not supported by empirical data 
when the model is considered as containing the true structure, it is not rejected, 
but instead a new model is constructed with the same true structure and  certain 
modifications (240).  Furthermore, economists hold a strong prior belief in 
economic theories that are based on well-specified optimization-based behavioral 
assumptions. All of this means that while anomalies may reject the permanent 
income hypothesis or the life-cycle hypothesis, this will only make economists 
modify the “true structure”, the Fisherian framework, instead of abandoning it 
(Chao, 243). In other words, the Fisher-Friedman-Modigliani theory could be 
seen as the core of the mainstream theory of consumption. 
V. Veblen’s theory of conspicuous consumption
 Veblen’s theory of conspicuous consumption is an extension of his concept 
of the “social” individual. In contrast to the orthodoxy’s static maximization 
of utility in an intertemporal framework, Veblen develops a model in which 
preferences are determined socially according to the position of an individual in the 
social hierarchy (Trigg 2001, 100). Veblen’s theory of conspicuous consumption 
starts with the development of a leisure class whose members are not required to 
work, but appropriate a surplus20 produced by the working class. Once societies 
start to produce that surplus, the relationship between private property and status 
grows in importance. To own property is to have a status in the hierarchy that 
emerges; to have no property is to have no status. 
20  Surplus here denotes the excess output above and beyond what is necessary to produce the means of liveli-
hood of the worker.
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 The accumulation of wealth could, of course, indicate that a person is 
efficient and productive, but Veblen contends that inherited wealth confers even 
more status. The money provides the most prestige, since it establishes the most 
distance from the work required for its accumulation. Key to the transformation of 
wealth into status is the social performance of the individual. Status stems from the 
opinion of the other members of the society regarding the position of an individual 
in that particular society. In order for this position to be established there must be a 
display of wealth. Veblen delineates two main ways for this to be done – through 
extensive leisure activities and through lavish expenditures on consumption. Their 
common feature is that they must entail a wasteful component. 
 In principle, both methods are equally effective in displaying wealth – all 
that is required is an effective network for the word to get around about a person’s 
degree of leisure and the objects he or she possesses. Veblen argues, however, 
that as societies become more mobile, the display of wealth through consumption 
becomes more important than the display of leisure, since people will be less 
informed about the leisure activities of others. Such consumption has a separate 
label in Veblen’s analysis – conspicuous consumption. It denotes spending on 
artifacts of consumption that would enhance the social position of the individual. 
 Conspicuous consumption is viewed by Veblen as one of the paramount 
factors in determining consumer behavior. This applies not just to the rich, 
but also to all social classes. The result of this theory is that members of each 
stratum in the society will emulate those above them and try to rank as high as 
possible in comparison to the rest of the community (Hunt 2002, 338). Another 
important facet of the theory is that the process is never ending; what at one time 
may confer status may later be acquired by all and confer no status, leading to a 
chronic dissatisfaction. In other words, the core of Veblen’s theory of conspicuous 
consumption is that consumption is socially determined and does not come from 
within the individual (Trigg, 100).
VI. Credit Card Use and Abuse: A Veblenian Analysis21
 There is an enormous amount of consumer credit card debt in the United 
States. Revolving credit card debt is about $900 billion and has increased at 9 
percent over the past decade (Scott 2007, 567). This became possible through an 
institutional change that lead to reduced regulation on credit card lending. The 
U.S Supreme Court’s 1978 Marquette Decision was primarily responsible for 
that. The ruling stated that only the usury ceiling of the state in which the bank is 
located and not that of the state in which the consumer is located, will restrict the 
interest rates (Scott, 568). Thus, it enabled banks to charge whatever interest rates 
they want on their credit cards loans by moving their credit card operations to 
states where there were limited usury laws. Consequently, credit cards exploded 
in use (Scott, 568).
21  This section is heavily borrowed from Scott, Robert H. 
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 The Fisher-Friedman-Modigliani theory of consumption, which as 
already explained is the building block of mainstream theories of consumption, 
does not account for why consumers took advantage of the available credit cards 
and began steadily accumulating debt at exorbitant interest rates, in most cases 
unable to repay that debt later (Scott, 568).  In order to construct the theory, which 
was already explained, Friedman and Modigliani had to make broad assumptions 
(Scott, 569). These included – individuals are rational, they have access to perfect 
information, possess foresight and stable and well-defined exogenous preferences. 
Furthermore, the life-cycle-permanent income hypothesis assumes away any 
role institutions may play in consumer spending/borrowing decisions. It makes 
individuals solely responsible for their credit card debt. Consequently, any public 
policy attempt to decrease it is doomed as the impetus comes solely from within 
the individual. 
 Veblen’s theory of conspicuous consumption could be used to treat the 
credit card issue in an entirely different way (Scott, 570). As already mentioned, 
Veblen’s theory stated that the propensity for emulation and conspicuous 
consumption are pervading traits of human nature. It is not standard items that 
guide our consumption, but rather those items that are just beyond our reach. 
Furthermore, most people want to be living in one class above what they presently 
live in. 
 Applying this to the issue of credit cards means that a large portion of 
borrowers will over-spend, first, because of the ever-rising income inequality in 
the U.S. that pushes people toward emulation, and, second, because of the easy 
access to credit, given without the necessary consideration of whether it could 
be repaid (Scott, 570). By borrowing people will have the ability to reach to a 
higher class level. The problem is further aggravated by the fact that, today, the 
variety of goods and services offered is unparalleled to any other time in history. 
Expensive clothes, vacations, restaurants – all that is easily available because of 
credit cards.
 Besides the emulative human nature, a Veblenian analysis identifies 
another cause for the credit card debt problem – the companies (Scott, 570). Veblen 
sees companies, such as the credit card ones, that are trying to produce nothing of 
substance and still get a profit as predatory lenders. Credit card companies extend 
credit to people arbitrarily, and when people fail to pay, they raise interest rates to 
absurd levels. 
 They also charge penalties and fees, which further aggravate the problem. 
Using Veblen’s metaphor, a parasite/host relationship emerges between debtors 
and credit card companies. Credit card companies drain their hosts, making a 
yearly profit of $90 billion dollars, 30 percent of which is generated from penalty 
fees (Scott, 571). The most profits are made from people who accumulate a 
considerable debt. Therefore, there is a clear incentive for credit card companies 
to maximize the financial indiscretion of individuals, luring them into borrowing 
that could not be repaid. 
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 As already mentioned, the neoclassical theory of consumption attempts to 
explain the enormous levels of credit card indebtedness as stemming from within 
the individual and thus gives no prescription for how to address the problem. In 
contrast, a Veblenian approach to the issue provides clear policy options (Scott, 
571). The driving force behind the credit card problem is the social influence on 
consumers to spend and the institutional setting that puts no reins on that. The first 
solution may be curbing the increasing income inequality in the United States, 
which is one of the factors, that spurs the never-ending process of emulation 
described by Veblen. People are quick to increase their consumption as income 
rises but they are slow in decreasing it after a relative fall in income. Thus, the 
widening income gap should be addressed as it reduces the relative income of a 
huge portion of the population. 
 The second solution is to directly address the institutional setting. As 
already mentioned, households are not able to handle the level of credit that the 
credit companies seek to provide them. Thus, a reasonable measure is to regulate 
credit card lending operations. In particular, a maximum limit should be put on 
credit card interest rates, fees and penalties. This would ensure that borrowers are 
given an amount of credit they can handle (Scott, 572). 
 In summary, a Veblenian analysis of the credit card over-borrowing 
problem provides clear-cut policy options. In contrast, the neoclassical approach 
gives no prescriptions whatsoever. The reason is that it disregards the role of 
institutions and assumes a rational individual that could not be experiencing an 
irrational problem of over-borrowing. 
VII. Changing face of mainstream economics
 The revival of Veblenian thinking is not limited to the particular example 
of credit card use. The face of modern economics is much more accommodating 
to Veblen’s ideas than the core neoclassical economic theory ever was (Hodgson 
2007, 328). During the 1980s, game theory established itself at the cutting-edge 
of mainstream economics, in part because of theoretical problems in general 
equilibrium analysis. The results of it depend on particular rules and modes of 
play of the game. Instead of everything being in contact with everything else as 
in general equilibrium analysis, game theory assumes limited interconnectedness. 
Thus, it is more accommodating to the ideas of institutions and rules. 
 Experimental economics also examines human interaction under 
designed system of rules (Hodgson 2007, 328). In simulating markets in the 
laboratory, experimental economists must set up a specific institutional structure. 
This, of course, challenges the neoclassical notion of the abstract market as a 
universal form of human interaction, free from any specific rules (Hodgson, 328). 
Experimental economics also makes the case for a situated rather than context-
independent concept of rationality. It claims that generalized rational preferences 
should be replaced by rules of thumb specific to the particular situation. It rejects 
the idea that people come to problems equipped with a complete set of preferences 
and clear decisions. 
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 Recent work in psychology has also undermined the rational deliberative 
thinking model of neoclassical economics (Hodgson, 329). It has been argued that 
this model downplays both the temporal and situated aspects of human reasoning. 
Instead of considering individuals as having representative models of the world in 
their brains, psychologists claim that human cognition depends on the social and 
material environment and on the interactions with other people. This is definitely 
a move away from the mind seen as an independent rational deliberator. 
 In summary, the core of neoclassical economics – the individual as a 
primary and given self – has been undermined by all these recent developments. 
Furthermore, the adoption of a context-dependent rationality as that is found in 
experimental economics and psychology is consistent with Veblen’s institutional 
economics in which agency and structure are mutually dependent. 
VIII. Assessment of ideas and conclusion
 In orthodox economics the individual is emptied out of all psychological 
content. His preferences are takes as given and his character is treated as irrelevant 
to any economic analysis. In contrast, the heterodox strand of economics views 
the individual as determined by social relationships. Veblen’s individual, being a 
social creature, falls squarely in that category. 
 As a corollary of its way of conceptualizing the individual, orthodox 
economics takes an axiomatic approach to economic theory. It claims that any 
criticism of that approach is ineffective unless it constructs a theory that yields 
better predictions than the one being criticized. On the contrary, heterodox 
economics, as represented by Thorstein Veblen’s theory, insists on a causal 
explanation of any characteristics attributed to the individual. 
 Two completely different theories of consumption stem from the two 
approaches – Veblen’s theory of conspicuous consumption and the mainstream 
theory of consumption. The first one stresses the social determination of 
consumption – individuals are always trying to emulate the spending habits of 
those that live one class above them. The second one treats the consumer as a 
rational being using an intertemporal framework to calculate his or her choice 
between present and future consumption. 
 Following Peukert’s assertion that Veblen creates no theory in any 
positive sense and Friedman’s defense of the superiority of the axiomatic approach 
to economic theory as capable of yielding better outcomes, it would be expected 
that the mainstream consumption theory is omnipotent, while Veblen’s theory of 
conspicuous consumption – totally ineffective. However, the case of credit card 
“use and abuse” suggests the opposite. 
 The Fisher-Friedman-Modigliani theory attributes the enormous amount 
of credit card debt in the United States to the choices of the individual; that is a 
tautology is employed – the aberrant behavior of the individual is explained as 
coming from within the individual. In contrast, Veblen’s theory of conspicuous 
consumption provides clear-cut policies that can address the issue (Scott, 571). 
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These include curbing the increasing income inequality in the United States and 
changing the current institutional setting – regulating credit card companies.
 In summary, the particular case of credit card use and abuse shows 
that Veblen’s theory of conspicuous consumption, while avoiding the axiomatic 
approach of orthodox economics is still capable of providing solutions to concrete 
problems. Furthermore, it suggests that it may not be the case that the more 
unrealistic the assumptions of a theory, the more powerful it will be, as Milton 
Friedman contends. By being a more accurate description of reality, Veblen’s 
theory does not render itself useless. On the contrary, it makes a better policy 
proposal than its mainstream counterpart. Moreover, the strength of Veblen’s 
analysis is not limited to a particular case or to a single theory. Some recent 
developments in the mainstream of economics – game theory and experimental 
economics – are rather accommodating to institutions and rules. This calls for a 
revival of Veblenian Institutional Economics (Hodgson, 325). 
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